Author: Uwe G. Kranz
First publishing: October 5, 2021 on https://ansage.org
Foreword
by CrisHam
I came across this remarkable article shortly after its publication on Ansage.org in October 2021. It provides a fact-based analysis of the war in Afghanistan (2001–2021) and the reasons for the failure of this mission, which cost nearly a trillion dollars. The conclusion of the second part sheds light on the broader context of the war, correctly identifying it as part of the resurgent rivalry between the liberal-democratic West and the Islamic Orient.
The Islamist’s Dual Strategy
While Western mainstream media ignore this subject—or even explicitly treat it as taboo—it remains deeply rooted in the political consciousness of Islamists. Within movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood, sympathy for terrorist violence is combined with an outwardly peaceful demeanor, all in the service of establishing a radical and expansionist ideology in Western nations.
The Taliban, who are at the heart of Uwe G. Kranz’s two-part documentation, likewise embody these two facets of Islamism. These Islamists are waging not only an armed struggle but also a propaganda-driven, ideological, and organizational jihad against all reform-oriented forces.
The withdrawal of the American military from Afghanistan and the Taliban’s advance in August 2021 may have triggered an emotional shock among the Western public, but they failed to prompt any rational insight—regarding both the root causes and the consequences. The collapse of the "democratic" government in Kabul marked the end of a charade that lacked any coherent, purposeful strategy. It was the manifestation of a deeper, historically evolved malaise: the progressive transformation of the Western security apparatus into an unchecked, autocratic "state within a state"—one that evades accountability for its own profound lack of efficiency. 1. The Parallel: Resistance to Insight—From Vietnam to Kabul
As early as 1965, in the midst of the Vietnam War, a scientific study by the RAND Corporation clearly demonstrated that most Viet Cong rebels were not fighting out of ideological conviction. Rather, they were resisting an American "liberation" that they perceived as a brutal foreign conquest. The strategy of carpet bombing, torture, and the use of inhumane weapons—such as napalm—only served to drive the population further into the arms of the insurgents. Yet, the political and military leadership surrounding President Johnson and Secretary of Defense McNamara remained resistant to such insights: the report was classified at the highest level, and the war was expanded, ultimately costing millions of lives. By the end of a conflict that dragged on for over 20 years, there were two victors: the communist adversary and, on the Western side, the military-industrial complex (MIC).
However, no lessons were learned from the disaster in Vietnam to inform later conflicts. This is evidenced by the two-part documentary presented here—authored by Uwe G. Kranz, former president of a state criminal police office (LKA)—which examines the mission in Afghanistan. As early as 2006–2007, insiders at professional conferences warned of flawed police training, rampant corruption, and an expanding drug trade. Nevertheless, the political leadership and mainstream media chose to sugarcoat the reality. For over two decades, the public was presented with the illusion of successful "nation-building," while, behind the scenes, a multi-billion-dollar budget was disappearing into the quagmire of a phantom force—"ghost soldiers."
The "State Within a State"
When power is removed from oversight, it inevitably continues to grow. Following the concealed findings of the RAND report, the CIA established the Phoenix Program in Vietnam in 1967, which systematized inhumane interrogation methods and torture. As public pressure mounted, these practices were by no means brought to an end; instead, they were merely relocated—from a global network of secret prisons ("black sites") to the eventual outsourcing of torture to paid local militias in Afghanistan—as the principles of the rule of law were deliberately circumvented.
Through the use of off-the-books "black budgets," a "revolving door" between the political sphere, the financial sector, and the arms industry, and the excessive invocation of "national security" as a pretext, the security apparatus has largely detached itself from democratic oversight. This internal structure fosters a dangerous selection mechanism:
Those who rise to the top are rarely individuals who genuinely represent the values of a free society; rather, they tend to be those willing to defend lies and torture before parliamentary committees and to ensure that evidence disappears.
Whistleblowers such as Julian Assange, Chelsea Manning, and Edward Snowden—who sought to warn citizens of grave dangers—were treated as enemies of the state under anachronistic laws like the Espionage Act of 1917. Yet, in doing so, they provided the leadership of the establishment with valuable material for internal reform.
In Afghanistan, the fundamental, self-serving delusions of an insulated security apparatus finally collided with the relentless realities of asymmetric warfare:
1. The adversary’s economic autonomy: While Western intelligence agencies and militaries stagnated in inefficiency, the failed counter-narcotics effort—coinciding with a surge in Afghanistan’s share of the global opium market from 5% to as much as 95%—rendered the Taliban financially self-sufficient. A guerrilla force that generates billions through the drug trade and maintains safe havens abroad cannot be defeated by conventional military might.
2. The collapse of the "paper army": A force built on corruption—where officers pocket salaries and soldiers are left abandoned without supplies—lacks any social foundation. The result was the surrender, without a fight, of over 400,000 small arms, 63,000 vehicles, and more than 160 aircraft to the Taliban—an unprecedented transfer of high-tech equipment to a radical guerrilla movement.
3. The loss of civilizational credibility: Those who dismantle the rule of law and freedom at home cannot export these values abroad. With the fall of Kabul, the jihadist movement received a powerful, symbolic signal: that patience and asymmetric tactics can force even a technologically superior global power to vacate the field.
Back to Democratic Control
The fiasco in Afghanistan was no accident; rather, it was the inevitable product of a security apparatus that has evaded parliamentary and public accountability. When technological superiority and trillion-dollar budgets no longer yield security—but instead merely prolong conflicts and secure sources of profit—the security apparatus itself becomes an existential threat to freedom.
Reconstructing a rule-of-law system that is capable of self-defense while remaining committed to peace therefore requires two fundamental reforms:
• Pruning emergency and special legislation: The right of the sovereign—the citizen—to be informed must take precedence over the concealment of institutional failure under the guise of secrecy.
• Breaking the cycle of autocratic internal selection: The security apparatus must be shielded from commercial interests in war through genuine civilian oversight and transparent promotion systems.
Without this systemic self-cleansing, the pattern seen in Vietnam and Afghanistan will continue unabated—at an ever-increasing cost to freedom, democracy, and global peace.
ARTICLE:
Triumph of the Taliban: „After Kabul comes Rome“ (Part 1)
by Uwe G. Kranz
Translation CrisHam
Two or three photos have come to symbolize the "disgraceful defeat of the West" in Afghanistan since August: the photograph of the military evacuation helicopter taking off from the roof of the US embassy in Kabul (drawing an analogy to Saigon in 1975), the greenish night-vision shot of Major General Chris Donahue, commander of the US Army's 82nd Airborne Division, as the last US soldier to leave Afghanistan, boarding an Air Force C-17 cargo plane, and the image of the Taliban unit posing in full US combat gear and with full weapons at Kabul airport. The press called them "iconic" images; images that express what they show: a dishonorable retreat, a complete failure, a loss of control, and more or less indirect gloating.
'Iconic' images, the press wrote; images that express what they do: a dishonorable retreat, a complete failure, a loss of control, and more or less indirect gloating.
... The war historian Herfried Münkler's description of this withdrawal as a historical turning point is only partially justified – for this turning point was not a singular event, but had several grandiose precursors in history:
Alexander the Great (334-331 BC), who quickly found the most astute solution in marrying a warlord's daughter to bring about a peaceful end to the terror and guerrilla war that he could not overcome with his powerful army.
The British (1832-1842 and 1878-1880), both times out of fear of Russian threats to the Indian crown colonies, both times with an arrogant and fatal underestimation of the freedom and independence aspirations of the proud Afghan tribes, and both times with historic, humiliating defeats.
... A Complete and Historic Failure
The Russians (1979-1989) attempted to stem the Iranian spark of Islamization in the region, a quest that proved costly, resulting in at least 15,000 deaths and an estimated $85 billion in war costs. Despite this, the Taliban gained influence and power. In 1989, the operation ended ignominiously and without victory – also marked by an iconic image: General Boris Gromov, after ten years of occupation, symbolically and almost defiantly retreated on foot across a border bridge into Russia, carrying red flowers. In 1996, the Taliban captured Kabul, proclaimed a theocracy, implemented Sharia law, provided refuge to al-Qaeda terrorists, and occasionally cooperated with them.
The operation ended ignominiously and without victory in 1989 – also with an iconic image of General Boris Gromov, symbolically, almost defiantly, retreating on foot across a border bridge into Russia after ten years of occupation. The Americans and their NATO allies (2001-2021) occupied Afghanistan after the attacks of September 11, 2001, with the ISAF mission (International Security Assistance Force), based on a UN Security Council resolution of December 20, 2001 – allegedly because it provided refuge to Osama bin Laden and the terrorist organization al-Qaeda, who were directing the global jihad from there. This became the longest military operation in US history, costing the lives of approximately 2,500 US soldiers, injuring or traumatizing more than 20,000, and costing almost 830 billion US dollars. Afghanistan thus became the US's second Vietnam.
Trillions of dollars and euros were sunk in the Hindu Kush, where, as then-Defense Minister Peter Struck (SPD) falsely claimed in May 2007, Germany's security was also being defended. One might give him credit for not knowing that the Taliban had already offered in 2004 to surrender to the overwhelming US alliance in perpetuity – but the US had neither accepted this offer nor informed its allies or its own people, for whatever reason, as Afghanistan's former president Hamid Karzai already complained in 2007. Therefore, Germany now also had to experience "its Vietnam" – as an American vassal, with 59 dead German soldiers.
The Fiction of the Well-Equipped Afghan Army
ISAF, at its peak numbering around 130,000 troops from 50 nations, was terminated without a stable, nationwide Afghan government with a functioning administration, without a resilient and effective Afghan National Army (ANA), which had already suffered tens of thousands of casualties in the fight against the Taliban, and without establishing sufficient and consolidated security forces (judicial, police, and public order services). Regarding the ANA, it should be noted that estimates of its strength varied between 85,000 and 200,000 troops; the figure of "nearly 300,000" supposedly fully equipped Afghan soldiers, cited by US President Joe Biden at a press conference on June 7, 2021, was a fiction.
... In 2014, ISAF was seamlessly replaced by the NATO mission "Resolute Support" (RS), which, with only 90,000 troops, was tasked with "resolutely supporting" the training and advising of Afghan security forces. This massive troop reduction was actually a harbinger of the withdrawal – because in the years leading up to 2014, the alliance's troops had already been reduced by an average of around 73 percent by the contributing states, each time at absolutely the wrong moment, which naturally led to a further strengthening of the Taliban.
... By February 2021, NATO's "Revolutionary Defense" mission had dwindled to a mere 9,600 troops. The focus had long since ceased to be on combating terrorism, defending democracy, or nation-building; at best, it was still focused on "army building." The negotiations in Paris and Doha between the US Special Envoy, Zalmay Khalilzad, and the then-head of the Taliban's political office, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, which excluded both the elected Afghan government and the US's NATO allies, were primarily aimed at reaching an agreement on terms resembling a surrender, reportedly from a position of strength. These negotiations, incidentally, were conducted under a veil of secrecy by the US with representatives of the Taliban, the Deobandi Islamist terrorist group founded in 1994. The Afghan government was not involved, and NATO allies were only partially or significantly delayed in receiving information. Not a sound exit strategy.
"Unable to see progress!"
The negotiations, which were conducted by the US with representatives of the Taliban, the Deobandi Islamist terrorist group founded in 1994, were conducted without any semblance of secrecy. Nevertheless, the justified accusations have also been leveled at the German government for years, which has been chasing castles in the air regarding foreign and security policy. Federal Foreign Minister Heiko Maas (SPD) continues to deny having conducted a disastrous situation analysis and having wasted valuable time, particularly on the evacuation of German citizens and their local staff; in an attempt to save his own skin, he even openly accused the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) of failure. However, he cannot deny that evacuation plans have been in place since April 2021, but have not yet been implemented.
In any case, the failure of the Western community of nations was nothing new, nothing sudden. While browsing through my archives, I came across my PowerPoint presentations from European Police Congresses and other international expert panels. As early as 2006 and 2007, I critically and realistically analyzed German police and military missions around the world – including in a packed hall of the Berlin Congress Center that could barely hold all the attendees; naturally, not exactly to the delight of those present. Despite the almost 10 billion euros in German development aid that had already flowed since 2005 to the 25 most undemocratic or corrupt heads of government or regimes in the world (a negative selection from the 199 countries of the world), despite all these foreign missions, no real progress had been achieved even then; neither by the European Union (e.g., EUPM, EUPT, EUBAM, EUPOL, EULEX), the OSCE, nor the UN (e.g., UNMIK, UNOMIG, UNMIL, UNMIS, UNAMID). Day-to-day political activism, nationalistic "catch-all" schemes, and vain or obsequious self-aggrandizement in politics and the media were already replacing international systems thinking and comprehensive, analysis- and evidence-based strategies.
Want an example from Afghanistan? The hubris of having, as part of the German EUPOL mission with 160 experts from 21 countries, created an Afghan National Police (ANA) with 70,000 officers – including 1 percent women – and built beautiful new police training facilities, obscured the security policy perspective of the reality in which the ANP's suitability, performance, and capabilities were quite low, and a lack of accountability, widespread corruption, and a high propensity for desertion prevailed.
The core problem was aptly described by the American journalist Sarah Chayes in April 2007, after years in Afghanistan, with the statement: "Corruption is not the right word to even adequately describe the scale of this phenomenon in Afghanistan." Nevertheless, Germany, in particular – following the motto "Unlimited Solidarity" – knowingly allowed itself to be drawn ever deeper into responsibility, for example through the deployment of (reconnaissance) for target identification since 2007, or through the deployment of the KSK as Quick Reaction Forces since 2008.