Author: Uwe G. Kranz
First publishing: October 6, 2021 on https://ansage.org
My then-devastating overall assessment of the police missions in Afghanistan was: understaffed, underfunded, lacking a master plan, lacking exit strategies, poorly structured ("designed"), and insufficient coordination of technical support. My cautious, but in retrospect still overly optimistic, conclusion: If it already took a decade to establish a reasonably sound security architecture at the EU level and another to better structure international cooperation there, then it will take many more decades to build a comprehensive global security architecture—and to achieve truly globally coordinated cooperation in combating Islamist terrorism in all its already diverse origins (Shiite, Sunni, other…) and its globally established branches, alliances, and provinces, as well as the associated organized crime.
My specific situation analysis as a keynote speaker at the European Police Congress in 2009 (title: "Focal Point Afghanistan – Lessons Learned") was even more drastic. A few examples: Even back then… Ten to fifteen of Afghanistan's 34 provinces were under the Taliban's permanent presence, meaning that one or more attacks were carried out every week; 72 percent of the provinces were under a substantial presence, meaning at least one attack was carried out every month. This power imbalance could not be halted in the following decade; on the contrary, it grew and stabilized year after year.
While the German Bundestag was praising German-Afghan school projects ("successes in the education sector") when only a few schools had been built and girls' classes established, the Taliban had destroyed over 650 schools, killed 141 teachers and students, and displaced over 173,000 students during the same period. This pressure on the education sector was maintained in the following years. The result: a continued dramatic rate of illiteracy, which still averages around 60 percent of the Afghan population today—"successes in the education sector" should look very different after two decades.
Praise in the Bundestag
Poppy cultivation and drug production—especially of opiates—had almost come to a standstill in 2001 due to the Taliban's rigid anti-drug policies. Within just a few years, however, the cultivated area rapidly tripled—despite the increasingly frequent (and costly) operations of the government's special drug eradication units (Poppy Eradication Forces, PEF). Afghanistan became the main supplier of opium—and now controls up to 95 percent of the global trade. By comparison, in 2001, before the Western invasion, it was 5 percent. Furthermore, the cultivation of cannabis was intensified, particularly in the northwest of the country; a novelty for Afghanistan in the early 2000s. By 2017, drug production had increased by over 60 percent. Today, we are confronted with a gigantic drug industry that generates billions in profits for the Taliban and poses seemingly insurmountable problems for the Western world.
For many years, the Taliban's military equipment had been at least satisfactory to good – thanks to support from numerous states, a steady stream of defectors who brought their gear with them, and the continuous capture of military camps and outposts. But it wasn't until the American withdrawal on August 30, 2021, that they had real cause for celebration: within just a few weeks, their fleet of vehicles grew by over 23,130 tanks and armored vehicles, as well as by around 40,000 trucks and SUVs. The arsenals that fell into the Taliban's hands are overflowing with almost 425,000 assault and machine guns, 126,000 handguns, and 176 artillery pieces; 162,000 radios, 16,000 night-vision devices, around 100 military helicopters, and 65 military and transport aircraft were captured, mostly without a fight.
... Many other, more prominent experts have critically examined German, European, American, and international policies on Afghanistan over the past two decades—and, of course, currently—far better than many of the members of parliament who regularly rubber-stamped the extension of the Bundeswehr mandates. The sheer volume of reports, news items, analyses, interviews, and video statements is simply overwhelming. Perhaps it would have been sufficed to simply read a book by the Franco-German journalist and publicist—and former soldier—Peter Scholl-Latour? That still holds true today—and would be my recommendation, at least to Messrs. Maas and Seehofer.
Highly recommended reading: Scholl-Latour
The question remains: How could (allegedly) around 85,000 Taliban (allegedly) so easily "defeat" over 300,000 highly trained Afghan security forces, including over 180,000 well-equipped military and air force units (ANA/AAF), and even seize all their equipment? Without international legal protection (the Doha "peace" agreement did not provide for the protection of Afghan military installations), with a corrupt and untrustworthy government, with extremely inadequate Afghan military leadership (bribery, significant shortages of ammunition and equipment, no pay, no food!), without US air support/military contractors, without the support and active cooperation of the population of this multi-ethnic state of Pashtuns, Baloch, Tajiks, Turkmen, Hazaras, and others (primarily due to the devastating civilian casualties of US airstrikes), with a high propensity for desertion and/or betrayal, without the will to fight or a consistent readiness to surrender, and above all: without the fundamental acceptance of a Taliban government—especially in rural areas—this would simply not have been possible.
Furthermore, it's important to remember that the Quetta Shura Taliban (QST), which has now become a reality with the new government, received its first legitimacy from the US in the spring of 2020 – with the start of the peace negotiations in Paris and Doha; its most recent legitimacy followed with the capture of Kabul after the president fled with suitcases full of cash and the establishment of the transitional government. Even the 6,000-strong force under the command of the Tajik Ahmad Sha Massoud, who until the very end tried to defend the Panjshir Valley against the Pashtun Taliban, surrendered after his bazaar-like haggling for a share of power – first 50 percent, then 30 percent – also proved unsuccessful. The old Afghan game of "I want to be the Caliph instead of the Caliph" didn't work in his case.
Haibatullah Akhundzada, the mysterious leader of the Taliban since 2016, who had been almost "invisible" for years because only a single photograph of him existed, now took over the leadership, founded the Islamic theocracy of Afghanistan – and in the meantime filled the 33 ministerial posts of his government exclusively with men, almost all Pashtun Taliban, including the new Interior Minister, terrorist Sirajuddin Haqqani, who is wanted worldwide on an arrest warrant, is on the FBI's US wanted list as a terrorist and for whom a bounty of up to 10 million USD has been offered. So much for "contractually guaranteed, peaceful inclusion."
Geopolitical Shifts
Have fun, Mr. Maas—or whatever our future Foreign Minister may be called—with the upcoming negotiations with the terrorist regime regarding the repatriation of the 300 (or 10,000?) "protection seekers" and their families, as well as the deportation regulations for criminal Afghans. Others (especially Germany) can then worry about the remaining 30,000 Afghans in need of protection who are already being housed in makeshift accommodations in US-allied countries—particularly the still numerous ones at the US base in Ramstein. Especially about the masses who will be left behind after the US "cherry-picking," after the targeted onward transfer of the few skilled workers and academics.
Now it is Pakistan's turn to look westward with concern – for nearly 23 million Pashtuns live in the Pakistani border region, and if they were to join forces with the 15 million Afghan Pashtuns, they would constitute a geopolitically highly volatile force. The Pakistani intelligence service, which for many years helped build and support the Afghan Taliban, now finds itself in a situation similar to that faced by the US after the withdrawal of the Soviet occupation forces: the boomerang of supporting terrorism is returning, hitting the thrower himself.
In terms of foreign policy, the path is clear: fearing the expected wave of refugees, Western leaders are signaling their willingness to engage in dialogue with the Taliban (who, in turn, expect substantial sums of money and political recognition in return), while China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi received the Taliban's "foreign minister," Abdul Ghani Baradar, for consultations weeks ago, and Russia is already planning and implementing long-term projects with the Taliban.
In terms of foreign policy, the path is predetermined
The Taliban have once again demonstrated that they can take on any major power. But they have also demonstratively shown the Islamic world that jihad can be won, that their system and values are sustainable in the long term – and they are signaling unequivocally: After Kabul comes Rome, the declared target of all Islamic terrorist groups and movements! 700 years is not an infinite timescale for true jihadists. And this comes just before the 20th anniversary of the al-Qaeda attacks. If that isn't a global jihadist wake-up call!
It is to be feared that any diplomatic concessions made to the Taliban will only serve the following purposes: to release funds tied up abroad and to secure new ones, for example through raw materials and subsidies; to gain time to achieve international acceptance and to establish or stabilize a kind of state-level, federal executive at the national level; Following the release of thousands of Taliban and al-Qaeda prisoners from Afghan jails, the aim is now to secure the release of imprisoned fighters abroad – including through negotiations for the repatriation of Western nationals and "local helpers"; to integrate their own cadres into the refugee flows in order to establish stable terrorist cells abroad, specifically to spread the terrorist jihad to Europe; to deepen the long-since secretly decided and now revived reunification of the Taliban and al-Qaeda; to unite with the Pakistani Taliban variant, TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan) – and possibly even to enter into cooperation with the Daesh province of ISK (Islamic State of Khorasan), which, as is well known, immediately claimed responsibility for the bloody attacks at Kabul airport and thus positioned itself unequivocally within the Afghan terrorist quartet.
The question remains: who is responsible for this epochal disaster? At least addressing this issue is "a matter of honor," said Lieutenant Colonel André Wüstner, chairman of the German Armed Forces Association, on a talk show. In my opinion, this doesn't go far enough; the question also arises of prosecuting the responsible state actors, whose inaction or incompetence has cost and will continue to cost lives.
End